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Major Busby, having completed twenty years of service in the Air
Force, became eligible for voluntary retirement in September 1962. In
June 1963, Major Busby and his wife were divorced, and the officer's
eligibility for retirement benefits was not considered by the court in dividing the property of the marriage. On the same day the divorce decree
was entered, the Air Force, having discovered that the officer was a diabetic, ordered that he be retired because of his disability. In 1967 Mrs.
Busby filed suit for partition of the disability retirement benefits paid to
her husband as of that date and of those to be paid in the future. The
trial court entered judgment that Mrs. Busby take nothing, but the Texas
court of civil appeals reversed, ruling that she should recover one-half
of the benefits as her community interest! Held, affirmed: Retirement
benefits that vest during marriage constitute community property. Busby
v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
I. THREE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN

DETERMINING

THE CHARACTER OF MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS

Any analysis to determine the character of property as separate or community must necessarily begin with this basic premise: All the property
acquired by the husband or wife during marriage is community property,
except that which is acquired by gift, devise, or descent.! It follows that
if military retirement benefits are a part of the community estate and not
the separate property of the serviceman-spouse, those benefits must be
(1) a property right, (2) acquired during marriage, and (3) not merely
a gift to the serviceman-spouse.
Property Right or Mere Expectancy. Since the Texas Constitution defines
the community estate as property, any interest that falls short of a property right can never be subject to the laws which determine marital property
rights in this state. Thus, until any interest a spouse might have in military
retirement benefits becomes a property right, that interest cannot be
community property.
At some point between the date an officer in the armed forces is commissioned and the date he begins to receive retirement pay, he acquires
the right to that payment. It may be cogently argued that this right vests
parties rendered consideration inappropriate. A statutory procedure, similar in many aspects to the
New York statute, was attacked on fourteenth amendment grounds. The statutory framework
provided that a landlord seeking to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent could file an affidavit, in
court, whereupon the sheriff would be ordered to deliver the premises to the landlord. Four days'
notice was required, but the only way the tenant could prevent immediate eviction was to submit
a counter-affidavit and post a bond equal to double the rent past due. This double rent would be
forfeited upon a judicial determination in favor of the landlord. However, if no bond could be
posted, the tenant would not be entitled to a judicial determination at all.
5

439 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01 (1970).

'TEx.

CONST.

art.

XVI, § 15.
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upon the date of the officer's retirement. In that case the election to retire
operates as a condition precedent to the acquisition of a vested interest in
retirement benefits. The right to elect to retire, and not the right to the
benefits, is conditioned solely upon the completion of a prescribed number of years in the service (usually twenty years for an officer on active
duty) .' Under this theory rights under community property laws would
attach only upon the officer's election to retire, for only then could he be
said to have acquired some property right.
An alternative approach might be to consider the right to retirement
benefits vested upon the date the requisite tenure of service is completed.
In that case the completion of twenty years of active duty operates as the
only condition precedent to the acquisition of the vested right. The failure
to elect to retire prior to death or dishonorable discharge operates as a
condition subsequent, working a forfeiture of the previously vested right
to retirement benefits. Under this theory community property laws attach
with the completion of a prescribed number of years in the service; the
application of the laws determining marital property rights does not
depend upon the officer's actual election to retire.
In Mora v. Mora5 the latter argument was favored by the San Antonio
court of appeals. That court relied upon the holding in Herring v. Blakeley, the first Texas supreme court case to recognize the interest of an employee-spouse in a qualified benefit plan as vested' prior to the actual
payment of those benefits.' In an attempt to distinguish Herring the
serviceman-spouse in Mora argued that, unlike profit-sharing and annuity
schemes, military retirement benefit programs included provisions making
all benefits subject to forfeiture on death prior to actual retirement. It
appears from the opinion in Mora that the use of the term "forfeiture"
undermined the serviceman's own argument. The court was quick to point
out that "[o]nly rights in existence can be forfeited."' Thus, in Mora
the interest of a serviceman-spouse in military retirement benefits was
deemed to have become a property right upon the completion of twenty
years of active service-the amount of time sufficient to entitle him to
elect to retire. The Mora court's application of the principle in Herring
to military retirement benefits makes clear the fact that such benefits will
" With the approval of the Secretary of the Air Force, an officer may be retired upon request
after twenty years of service. 10 U.S.C.A. 5 8911 (1970). The officer then becomes entitled to retirement pay. 10 U.S.C.A. § 8889 (1970). A schedule of computation is provided at 10 U.S.C.A.
5 8991 (1970).
5429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968), error dismissed, w.o.j., noted in 22
Sw. L.J. 888 (1969).
6 38; S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
7Hughes, Community-Property Aspects of Profit-Sharing and Pension Plans-Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Future, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 860, 865 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Hughes].
' It is submitted that the facts in Herring and Mora are not perfectly analogous. In the former
case the court stressed that the employee-spouse had full and unconditional ownership of a benefits
account, but was not yet entitled to draw upon that account. In Mora, since there was not an
account, there was no property to which ownership could attach. See McKnight, Matrimonial
Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 45 n.7 (1969).
9429 S.W.2d at 662.
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be considered property rights, even though the actual payment of such
benefits is wholly dependent upon the serviceman's election to retire.
Acquisition During Marriage. The community has no interest in property
which is not acquired during the existence of the community." Assuming
a serviceman's interest in his military retirement to be a property right
that vests upon the completion of a requisite tenure of service, community
property laws still do not attach so as to affect that right unless it is
acquired1 during marriage.
A basic rule of Texas community property law is that the character
of property is determined as of the date of its acquisition.' Since a serviceman's interest in retirement benefits does not become a property right
prior to the completion of twenty years of service," no property right may
be acquired prior to that date. Thus, any interest in military retirement

benefits is community property only if the serviceman is married as of
the date he becomes entitled to elect to retire and collect those benefits.'
It follows that the marital status of the serviceman on the date he completes the requisite tenure of service fixes the character of the property
as separate or community.2 In this argument the inception-of-title rule
is controlling.
Another approach might be to apply the inception-of-title doctrine
differently, asserting that the title to military retirement benefits is fixed
with the enlistment or commission of the serviceman.' This argument is
specious, however, because any interest in the benefits is not a property
right as of that date, but a mere expectancy."
A third possibility might be to disregard the inception-of-title rule
'0TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01 (1970).
" Nevertheless, the term acquired is to be given a broad interpretation. Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex.
392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923). Such an interpretation supports the idea that the term should not be
limited to present possessory interests.
"Smith v. Buss, 135 Tex. 566, 144 S.W.2d 529 (1940); Hughes 869.
" In Mora, 429 S.W.2d at 662, it was held that the serviceman's interest became a property
right only after sufficient military service.
" An analogy may be drawn to the situation in which one takes possession of real property as
a naked trespasser, later marries, and, still later, acquires title to the property by adverse possession.
It has been held that the property takes its character from the time of the running of the statute
and, therefore, is the community property of the title holder and his spouse. Bishop v. Lusk, 8
Tex. Civ. App. 30, 27 S.W. 306 (1894).
"5 In construing the Arizona community property statute (one very similar to the Texas law)
a United States court of appeals reached precisely this conclusion. Commissioner v. Wilkerson, 368
F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'g 44 T.C. 718 (1965). It is interesting to note that this case was
cited in the civil appeals opinion in Busby, 439 S.W.2d at 690. For a complete discussion of Wilkerson, see Lay, Retirement Income Credit and Community Property: A Problem of Vesting, 42
TL. L. REv. 304, 310 (1968). See also Hughes 870.
"0This term refers to the concept that the time of acquisition fixes the character of the property as separate or community. See Note, Community Property-Deferred Compensation Plans-Interest of the Nonemployee Spouse at Divorce, 19 Sw. L.J. 370, 374 (1965).
" An analogy may be drawn to the situation in which one takes possession of real property
under color of title, later marries, and, still later, perfects that title through adverse possession.
It has been held that the property takes its character from the time of the original claim and, so,
is the separate property of the claimant. Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 224 S.W.2d 471 (1949).
The analogy breaks down, however, if the officer has no colorable title to retirement benefits upon
his commission.
oMora compels this conclusion.
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altogether and apply the "apportionment principle.""9 Under this theory
military retirement benefits are characterized according to the marital
status of the serviceman throughout his military career." If, for example,
a serviceman were single for the first five years of his military career,
and then married for the next ten years, and then single once again (following dissolution of the marriage) for the final five years of his twentyyear period of active service, one-half of his military retirement pay would
be the community property of the marriage dissolved five years earlier.
The fact that he was single at the time he acquired a property right in
the benefits would not defeat the right of the community to a portion
of the payments. Stated another way, the community owns an interest
commensurate with the number of years it existed during the period
in which the interest of the serviceman-spouse matured.
A final method for resolving the character of military retirement benefits according to their acquisition during marriage would be to apply the
inception-of-title rule to determine the existence of any community interest, and then apply the apportionment principle to determine the extent
of that interest. That is, the marital status of the serviceman at the end
of twenty years would determine whether or not the community estate
was entitled to any portion of the retirement pay; the number of years
of marriage during the serviceman's military career would determine how
much of the newly acquired property right belonged to the community.
It is not absolutely clear, but it appears that Texas courts have accepted
this last method.
In Kirkham v. Kirkham 5 the serviceman-spouse married after twelve
years in the military. During the eighth year of marriage he became entitled to military retirement benefits.' Two years later his wife sued for
divorce and was awarded a thirty per cent interest in his retirement pay.
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's division of the property
by holding that the benefits accrued during marriage and, therefore, were
community property. It is not clear what the court meant by its use of
the term "accrued." Perhaps the court meant to imply that the right to
the benefits had vested during the marriage. If so, such an implication
would seem to favor the inception-of-title doctrine. It is not clear, however, whether the existence of the community interest depended upon
the marital status of Mr. Kirkham at the time the right to retirement benefits vested (i.e., at the end of his twenty-year tenure of service).' In
addition, the holding implies that the community interest extended to all
the benefits. Under the apportionment principle, however, only two-fifths
" This theory has also been referred to as the "tracing principle." See, e.g., Note, supra note 16,
at 374-75. But the term is somewhat misleading since it is usually associated with another unrelated rule of community property law.
" If a serviceman marries after enlistment or commission, the extent of the community interest
may be calculated by dividing the number of months in the service into the number of months
during the marriage relationship which were spent in the service.
1 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960).
22 Since the election to retire was not discussed in the case, it is reasonable to assume that
the serviceman in Kirklhasm took advantage of his right to retire as soon as that right vested.
" Since the parties were married at the end of the husband's twenty-year service career, the
court was not forced to consider this possibility.
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of the benefits were clearly the property of the community.24 Nevertheless,
the court actually affirmed a decision which awarded Mrs. Kirkham a portion of the benefits roughly in keeping with her share of the community

as determined under the apportionment principle.' In the final analysis
the case does little to explain exactly what prerequisites must be met in
order for the community to acquire an interest in military retirement

benefits. The actual result of the case does, however, indicate a preference
for the application of the apportionment principle.
Mora goes further in resolving the question of acquisition during marriage. As in Kirkham the suit for divorce was instituted after the officer
had served long enough to establish his eligibility for benefits upon his
election to retire. As shown earlier, the Mora court considered the benefits
vested by reason of sufficient time in the service." This holding implies
that acquisition during marriage contemplates a vesting of property rights
while the parties are husband and wife. It follows that the community can
acquire a property right in the prospective benefits only if the all-important date when eligibility to retire attaches actually falls during the existence of the marriage. Mora, therefore, appears to favor the inception-oftitle doctrine." However, the Mora court then proceeded to actually calculate the community share of the potential benefits. The community was
considered to have acquired an interest commensurate with the number
of months during the service career which were spent in marriage. Under
this holding the extent of the community interest is governed by the
marital status of the serviceman during his tenure in the service. The
inception-of-title principle is used to determine whether a community
interest actually exists, and the apportionment principle is applied to
determine the extent of that interest.
Compensation or Gift. Even if an interest may be said to amount to a
vested property right which is acquired during marriage, a showing that
the property was acquired by gift defeats the community property presumption."9 A few older cases alluded to retirement plans as "charitable
enterprises. ' 0 As gifts they necessarily became the separate property of
the donee-spouse. These cases overlooked the fact that the principal prerequisite to participation in a retirement plan is the continued employment
of the participant. Today retirement benefits are uniformly considered
a form of employee compensation. Thus, the more recent cases have
24 The parties were husband

and wife for eight years of the husband's twenty-year service

career.
" Although the wife's share of the precise community interest was shown to be 27.89o, the
additional award was said to be within the discretion of the trial court. See note 49 infra.
26See note 13 supra.
2 See note 16 supra.
"sWebster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969), is in accord. In
that case a spouse had served in the Air Force for twenty-four years; throughout the final twenty
years he was married. On divorce his wife was awarded 10/24ths of his retirement benefits.
" TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §5 5.01, 5.02 (1970).
SoSee Note, supra note 16, at 372, and cases cited therein.
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consistently held that such benefits are community property so long as
they are acquired during marriage."
The military retirement benefit cases are in accord. In Kirkham the
benefits were characterized as "an earned property right."' Eight years
later Mora reinforced this conclusion.' This argument against treating
retirement benefits as community property has apparently been settled
in favor of the community.
II.

BUSBY v. BUSBY

Since any community interest that is not divided on divorce gives rise
to a tenancy in common between the former spouses," a subsequent determination that any undivided interest was a part of the community
estate would sustain the right of either of the former spouses to a partition
of that interest. The right to partition is purely an incident of the cotenancy relationship.' Thus, the central issue in Busby v. Busby' was
whether Major Busby's military retirement benefits should be characterized as separate or community property. A demonstration of the community character of those benefits was essential to establish Mrs. Busby's
right to a share of the retirement payments.
After formulating that issue, the Texas supreme court considered Major
Busby's contention that, since he had not elected to retire at the time of
the divorce, he had acquired no property rights in the benefits as of that
date. If he had acquired no property rights in the benefits during marriage, it followed, in applying the inception-of-title rule, that the community
could have no interest in those benefits. The court endorsed the proposition
that the property right to the benefits vested when Major Busby became
entitled to elect to retire. Since he was married on that date, the right to
the benefits was held to have vested during marriage.
Major Busby also asserted that if he had acquired a right at all, its
characterization must have been fixed at the time of his commission,
which was prior to the marriage. But the fact that the right to retire with
benefits vests only with the completion of the requisite number of years
in the service ruled out the possibility that the right could have been acquired earlier. Thus, the court apparently endorsed the idea that "acquisition during marriage" demands that the right to retire must attach
prior to dissolution of the marriage.
Next the court considered Major Busby's contention that Mora was
distinguishable because it represented a division of property under the
broad discretionary powers afforded trial courts in cases of divorce." The
court pointed out that Mora went so far as to actually calculate the community interest. Since the Mora court undertook a determination of the
"'See, e.g., Herring v. Blakely, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
32335 S.W.2d at 394.
83429 S.W.2d at 662.
'Taylor v. Catalon, 140 Tex. 38, 166 S.W.2d 102 (1942).
' Keller v. Keller, 135 Tex. 260, 141 S.W.2d 308 (1940).
36457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
37
See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63 (1970).
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community share, it apparently did not rely solely upon the equitable
power of division on divorce. By so holding the supreme court dispelled
the argument that any division of a serviceman's retirement benefits on
divorce amounts to nothing more than a divestiture of his separate property, a mere exercise of the district court's broad discretion.
Almost as an aside, the Busby court summarily dismissed the notion
that retirement benefits were a mere gratuity. Kirkham, it was said, clarified the fact that such benefits were earned property rights. Since they
are onerously acquired, and not rewards or charitable contributions, they

cannot be considered gifts. Thus, it appears settled that military retirement benefits do not fall under this constitutional exception to the rule
that property acquired during marriage is the property of the community."
Finally Major Busby alleged that since Mora and Kirkbam had dealt
with voluntary retirement benefits, they were distinguishable from a case
in which the serviceman's retirement was involuntary. The court did not
consider this to be a meaningful distinction. The statutes authorizing both
types of retirement were examined in detail."' The court simply concluded
that there was no difference between the two plans that would call for
the application of a different rule to determine the character of the benefits.
III. THE PROBLEMS UNRESOLVED BY BUSBY
By approving the Mora holding, Busby will be cited for the proposition
that the interest of a serviceman in his military retirement benefits becomes
a vested property right when only the election to retire separates him from
actual payment. Since no property may be acquired until it is first property, it follows from this holding that such rights may be considered acquired only upon the completion of a prescribed number of years of active
military service. As a result of this decision two of the previously discussed
alternatives for determining acquisition during marriage are ruled out.4"
Of the two remainng possibilities, one considers only the marital status
of the serviceman on the date the property right vests as the factor determining the character of the benefits.' The other possibility also considers the marital status at the date the right vests to be the factor in
determining the existence of the community interest. Yet this second
approach goes further to consider the extent of that interest as determined
by the marital status of the serviceman throughout his military career."
It is not clear which of these theories for determining the character of the
serviceman's retirement benefits is adopted in Busby.
In Busby the court gives considerable attention to the Mora opinion.
"'See Note, supra note 16, at 372, and cases cited therein.
89Disability retirement benefits are authorized under the provisions of 10 U.S.C.A. § 1201

(1970). For the statutes governing voluntary military retirement benefits, see note 4 supra.
4 Busby clearly rejects the argument that the serviceman's interest is incepted with his commission. Furthermore, Busby dismisses the theory that the existence of any community interest
is determined solely by the marriage of the serviceman at any point during his military career.
41 This is the inception-of-title rule.
"This theory is a hybrid of the inception-of-title rule and the apportionment principle.
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Mora seems to endorse the latter theory, recognizing both the inceptionof-title doctrine and the apportionment principle. Yet it does not follow
that Busby observes the holding in Mora in all respects. Although Busby
goes so far as to spell out the calculation by the Mora court of the community interest in the latter case, the Busby court does not follow that
rationale in partitioning the community interest earned by Major Busby.
The court of civil appeals' decision in Busby resulted in a reversal of
the lower court's decision,' and an award to Mrs. Busby of one-half of
all the retirement payments. The Texas supreme court, in affirming that
decision ignored the fact that Major Busby had joined the Air Force four
years prior to his marriage to Mrs. Busby. Under an application of the
Mora decision the community interest in Major Busby's retirement benefits should have been calculated as four-fifths of the total benefits.
Any attempt to rationalize why the supreme court endorsed the Mora
holding and then, without explanation, ignored one major aspect of the
method followed therein would be conjecture. It should be noted, however, that the opinion in Mora never discussed the reason for dividing
the benefits according to the marital status of the serviceman throughout
his military career. Perhaps the Mora court simply assumed that the community could not possibly possess an interest in that portion of an expectancy which had matured prior to marriage. Yet, regardless of whether
the Busby court made any such assumption, a contrary result was reached
in Busby-and with no accompanying reasoning.
If Busby does in fact stand for the proposition that the marital status
of the serviceman during the course of his service career is irrelevant, and,
thus, only the marital status at the date the property right vests is controlling, the consequences are bound to lead to inequities. If, for example,
a serviceman, under a twenty-year military retirement program, marries
in his nineteenth year of service and divorces in his twenty-first year,
his spouse of only two years will innure to one-half of his total benefits
upon retirement. Merely because the serviceman was married upon completion of the crucial twentieth year, his total benefits are characterized
as community property. A subsequent divorce will, most likely, result in
an assignment to his wife of one-half of all the payments he will receive
from the date of his election to retire until his death. The resulting inequity
to the serviceman-spouse is apparent."
On the other hand, any rule that requires the existence of any community interest in military retirement benefits to be determined solely
by the marital status of the serviceman upon the date when the property
right vests (i.e., at the end of twenty years) is likely to produce inequitable results, reducing to a nullity the interest of a former wife. Under
48439 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
"As to non-military retirement benefits, it has been suggested that even though an employee
is not entitled to all of his benefits at the date of divorce, any interest which has been acquired
should be treated as community property. Hughes 871. This rule is well suited to determining
the character of an interest in a periodic payment retirement plan. The problem is that under the
rule in Busby nothing is acquired prior to twenty years of active service. Thus, community property laws cannot attach at an earlier date.
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such a rule, for example, if husband and wife are married on the same
date the husband joins the service, but the marriage is dissolved during
the nineteenth year, the community has no interest in the rights which
vest one year later. It should be noted that even an application of the
reasoning in Mora, recognizing both the inception-of-title doctrine as
controlling and the apportionment principle as determining the extent
of the interest, would produce such a result. It appears, then, that in
formulating a rule which recognizes military retirement benefits as property rights prior to actual retirement, the courts in both Mora and in Busby
have devised a theory that is bound to engender inequitable results for
some spouses of servicemen.' Busby compounds the problem, however,
because a rule which ignores altogether the marital status of the serviceman throughout his career (i.e., even for the purpose of determining the
extent of the interest of the community), but demands that the serviceman be married at the date the property right becomes vested, can produce inequitable results for both spouses.
Busby does make one fact clear. The same rule that determines the
character of voluntary retirement benefits should be applied to determine
the character of disability retirement benefits. The details and prerequisites
of each type of retirement are given considerable attention. Nevertheless,
the court fails to consider glaring differences. Disability benefits are obviously more contingent than are benefits under voluntary retirement programs. Under a voluntary military retirement plan an interest in prospective benefits may be characterized as a vested property right because, assuming the serviceman has served for a prescribed number of years, only
the election to retire separates him from actual payment. The contingency
is entirely within the control of the serviceman. In a plan providing for
disability benefits, on the other hand, the contingency separating the
serviceman from actual payment is the disability itself. Thus, it may be
cogently argued that any right to disability benefits vests no sooner than
the disability is discovered. The disability itself operates as a condition
precedent to prevent the vesting of any right to benefits until the serviceman is shown to be disabled. The benefits should, therefore, be treated
as expectancies to which community property law does not attach until

the benefits have been realized."
Since Major Busby's disability was incurred prior to his divorce and
since he was ordered to retire on the date the divorce decree was entered,
the court was probably correct in holding that the right to the disability
benefits was acquired during marriage. Under the inception-of-title doctrine it follows that the community acquired some interest in those bene-

fits. At the time of the divorce, however, no benefits had actually been
paid. This raises the problem of how courts may partition property that
has vested, but which is not yet in esse. The problem is not confined to
' Without such a rule, however, the constitutional prerequisite of acquisition during marriage
is not met. Furthermore, to disregard the necessity for such a rule is to disregard the inceptionof-title doctrine, one of the strongest principles in the Texas law of community property.
4 Hughes 870.
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the situation in which the right to disability benefits is acquired. Such a
difficulty will also arise in dividing voluntary retirement benefits that are
deemed to have become property rights, but which are unavailable for
division because the serviceman-spouse has not yet elected to retire.
Furthermore, the problem will not be confined to suits for partition, but
will also appear in suits for divorce. Certainly a divorce court may take
remainder and reversionary interests into account in assessing the community estate and making a division of the property of the spouses. But
forcing a present distribution of the interest in a vested plan that is to
be paid in the future, whether upon divorce or in a suit for partition,
may be inequitable to the beneficiary of the plan." In Mora Justice Cadena,
recognizing that valuation of such a community interest was not free
from complications, suggested that the serviceman be required to make
periodic payments to his former spouse if and when the benefits are
received.' Strictly speaking, under the facts in Busby, Major Busby was
precluded from receiving the voluntary retirement benefits to which he
would have otherwise been entitled upon his election to retire. Thus, any
interest he had in voluntary retirement was forfeited upon his receipt
of disability benefits. Since such benefits were never received and all
incident rights to payment under the formerly vested right were erased,
any interest formerly vested in the community was likewise abrogated.
Perhaps, if the disability benefits Major Busby received had been awarded
after the date of the divorce, Major Busby could have used such an argument to show that the rights acquired by the community before dissolution had been forfeited because of his disability. Nevertheless, since the
officer was ordered to retire the same day the divorce became final, the
court was not forced to contend with this argument. The disability was
both incurred and discovered during marriage. The right to the benefits
intended to compensate that disability was, therefore, subject to the law
determining the extent of any community interest.
IV. CONCLUSION

Busby represents the Texas supreme court's first confrontation with the
problems inherent in considering the character of military retirement
benefits. The facts presented in Busby were particularly suitable for conclusively determining the community's interest in such benefits, because
a determination of the existence and extent of that interest were essential
to reach the question of partition.49 Unfortunately Busby does not answer
47

Id. at 880.
48429 S.W.2d at 663.
" Since in a suit for partition of property not divided upon divorce the character of the
property is a crucial factor, the question of characterization was squarely before the court in
Busby. The courts of civil appeals have not been so compelled to resolve this issue. The few
earlier cases on point involved divorce suits. As a result, any imprecision on the part of the lower
courts in calculating the community interest was considered an exercise of the broad powers
given to the courts in dividing property upon divorce. Kirk/ham is exemplary of this approach.
The most striking example, however, is found in Berg v. Berg, 115 S.W.2d 1171 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort
Worth 1938), error dismissed. In that case it was held that the character of the
property in question need not be determined at all. Characterization was not a controlling issue,

